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Abstract
We present evidence that cultural proximity (shared codes, beliefs, ethnicity) be-
tween lenders and borrowers increases the quantity of credit and reduces default.
We identify in-group lending using dyadic data on religion and caste for officers
and borrowers from an Indian bank, and a rotation policy that induces exogenous
matching between them. Having an in-group officer increases credit access and loan
size dispersion, reduces collateral requirements, and induces better repayment even
after the in-group officer leaves. We consider a range of explanations and suggest
that the findings are most easily explained by cultural proximity serving to mitigate
information frictions in lending.
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1 Introduction
Shared codes, language, religion—what we will call cultural proximity—between potential
parties of a transaction can affect the likelihood that the transaction takes place, and also
its outcome. Commonalities in religion and in ethnic origin, for example, are positively
associated with trade flows between countries (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2009). The
effect of cultural proximity on the quality and efficiency of transactions where parties are
asymmetrically informed is ambiguous, however. There are two prominent explanations,
both of which predict a higher level of transactions between culturally proximate parties,
but with divergent predictions on the economic value of these transactions. On the one
hand, if members of a group tend to do business with one another for preference-based
reasons, this may lead to discrimination or favoritism and result in resource misalloca-
tion. Alternatively, if cultural proximity reduces asymmetric information by, for example,
reducing the cost of communication or contract enforcement, in-group transactions may
create more economic value for both parties. Given these opposing forces, the effect of
cultural proximity on outcomes in markets with asymmetrically informed participants is
an empirical question, and the focus of our analysis in this paper.
There are a number of challenges in empirically examining the various consequences
of preferential in-group treatment, and distinguishing among the various explanations
underlying such behavior. First, it requires information on the group membership of both
transacting parties. Most studies have been conducted at a high level of aggregation
(as in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2009, for example); or they have relied exclusively
on the religion or race of only one side of the market, and have thus been best set up
to detect discrimination against minorities rather than dyadic preferences for one’s own
type. This confounds any improvement in outcomes from in-group interactions with
statistical or animus-based discrimination, especially when the in-group advantages are
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more prevalent within relatively small minority groups. Second, even when dyadic data are
available, matching between parties is driven by the expected profitability of transactions,
which is not observed by the econometrician. Unobservable differences in profitability—
for example, in the case where minority agents are relatively “unprofitable”—may result
in finding no in-group preferences within minority groups even when one exists, or an in-
group preference among majority groups even when none exists. Finally, it is difficult to
assess the distortions introduced by information frictions in many economic transactions—
the sale price of an automobile (as in Ayres and Siegelman, 1995), for example, largely
involves the distribution of a fixed pie.
We use data from a large state-owned bank in India, a setting that is well-suited to
studying the consequences of, and rationales for, preferential in-group treatment in in-
dividual interactions with private information. The setting makes it possible to better
confront the three identification problems highlighted above. Detailed credit and person-
nel records allow us to match all borrowers and branch head officers to their religion and
caste, providing a dyadic characterization of the cultural “distance” between transacting
parties in the allocation of personal loans for almost three million borrowers over a five
year period. An explicit officer rotation policy among branches provides variation in the
matching between lenders and borrowers. We are thus able to control effectively for time-
invariant attributes of borrowers and lenders, and for time varying credit conditions of
each group within narrowly defined geographic markets. Further, using detailed records
on loan characteristics and their ex post performance we can identify the degree to which
cultural proximity may reduce the rationing of credit, the main distortion that arises in
the face of severe information asymmetries (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In addition to the
econometric advantages of our data, understanding the link between culture and infor-
mation frictions is of first order importance in an environment characterized by credit
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rationing and a long history of religious and caste conflict.1
We find strong evidence of preferential in-group treatment. In the baseline results
we define two individuals as belonging to the same group when both are members of
the same minority religion (Christian, Muslim, Sikh, Parsi, or Buddhist) or, conditional
on belonging to the majority religion (Hindu), when both belong to the same official
caste (General Class, Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, or Other Backward Classes). In
our preferred (and most conservative) specifications, we find that on average, the total
amount of new loans to borrowers in a group increases by 6.5% when the officer assigned
to the branch belongs to the same group. Having an in-group officer also increases the
number of new loan recipients by 5.7% and the probability that a member of the group
receives any credit by 2.5%. The inclusion of branch-quarter, district-group-quarter, and
group-branch fixed effects in our analysis indicates that the estimated effects are not
driven by unobserved variation in the demand for credit by any group or at any locality,
by policies that direct credit differentially to different groups and regions over time, or
by reverse causality, where officers are transferred to areas where her group is thriving.
The results are also robust to an alternate and independent classification where we use
individuals’ surnames to assign borrowers and officers based on the religious caste system
that prevailed in ancient India. This rules out the possibility that our findings result from
systematic errors in the classification of individuals in the bank’s records, or by targeted
lending policies based on this classification.
We then go on to examine the effect of in-group lending on the quality of credit
provision and the cost of credit to borrowers. Loans made to in-group borrowers have
better repayment performance ex post. The economic magnitude of this effect is large:
in-group borrowers are 0.6 percentage points less likely to be late in loan payments, a
1For evidence and discussions, see Banerjee, Cole, and Duflo 2004, Banerjee and Duflo 2008, and Field
et al. 2008.
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7% decline relative to the average default probability in the sample (8.6%). The decline
in default probability persists even after the in-group officer is replaced by an out-group
one, implying that the effect on loan quality is not driven by officers rolling over loans to
bad borrowers (evergreening). Since all loans have the same interest rate, we evaluate the
effect of proximity on the cost of borrowing through its impact on the collateral required
per rupee of credit. We find that cultural proximity lowers the cost of borrowing measured
this way. Under mild assumptions, our credit quality and quantity results also imply that
cultural proximity improves the profitability of lending.2
Standard models of in-group favoritism predict resource misallocation, as transacting
agents trade off efficiency against higher payoffs from the utility gain of favoring their
in-group counterparts. In our context this would imply loan officers bearing the cost
of higher default rates in exchange for lending more to their own group. In contrast,
standard models of credit markets with asymmetric information predict that, if cultural
ties reduce information asymmetries (either ex ante because of better communication or
ex post because of better enforcement), they should lead to less credit rationing, e.g.,
more and cheaper credit to lower risk borrowers. The prima facie evidence from our main
results is consistent with the latter type of models.
We emphasize that our data do not allow us to rule out all favoritism-based expla-
nations. In particular, the distinction we describe in the previous paragraph focuses on
types of favoritism that generate lower performance for the loan officer, which captures
the cost he bears for favoring his own type. We offer some additional results that help to
further evaluate our rationing interpretation, in particular repeating our estimation using
only branches in districts where the bank we study is the only formal lender. We find that
cultural proximity leads to an expansion of credit even in areas where the only alterna-
2Specifically, we require the further assumption that government banks in India lend too little relative
to their marginal cost of capital. This view finds empirical support in Banerjee, Cole, and Duflo 2004,
Banerjee and Duflo 2008.
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tive source of funds are expensive moneylenders. In these areas, borrowers cannot simply
substitute across similarly priced funding sources. This reinforces the interpretation that
cultural proximity may reduce credit rationing.3
In a final set of analyses, we look at the specific predictions of existing models of
information frictions in lending, and examine the extent to which these predictions are
borne out in the data. Cornell and Welch (1996) suggest that cultural proximity may
reduce information asymmetries in a credit transaction by improving the precision of the
signal that the officer obtains of a borrower’s creditworthiness. A direct prediction of
their model is that cultural proximity should increase the variance of loan sizes, as the
officer’s distribution of prior beliefs of borrower quality widens with the more precise
signal. Consistent with this prediction, we find that in-group loans have a substantially
larger size dispersion than out-group ones. Rajan (1992) argues that the repeated interac-
tion between a lender and a borrower provides the lender with “soft” private information
about a borrower’s credit quality. We can examine the role of repeated interaction by
looking at heterogeneity of the in-group effect across first-time and existing borrowers,
and over time as the loan officer and the borrower interact. We find that officers expand
lending to in-group borrowers that have a prior relationship with the bank as well as to
new borrowers, and that the credit expansion occurs immediately on the officer’s arrival
at a branch and persists throughout his tenure. These results suggest that the benefits of
cultural proximity are distinct from and additive to those that potentially derive from a
borrower’s observable track record with the lending institution or those that come from
repeated interaction between officer and borrower.
Our main conclusion, that cultural proximity improves the quantity, quality, and cost
of lending, has a number of economic and policy implications that are independent of the
3Our estimates of the effect are also significant and of comparable magnitude in areas where there are
many alternative sources of formal funding. In these areas, however, we do not have means of pinning
down whether or not cultural proximity alleviates credit rationing.
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specific mechanism through which it operates. The first is that the net positive effect
of cultural proximity on credit outcomes can be mistaken for discrimination in the data,
since minority borrowers are far less likely to be “matched” with an in-group lender than
borrowers that belong to a large group. A naive regression of loan access on borrower
group identity that ignores the group identity of the lender would indicate discrimination
against minorities rather than preferential in-group treatment among all groups. This
calls for caution in the interpretation of, and policy prescriptions that can be derived
from, empirical studies that identify differential treatment based solely on the identity
of one of the parties of the transaction. This point is raised theoretically in Cornell and
Welch (1996).4
A second, related implication is that a naive data analysis may also lead to the for-
mation of statistical discrimination against minority groups. Even if all groups in the
population have the same ex ante average propensity to default, minority group borrow-
ers will have a worse credit repayment history because they are more likely to be matched
to an out-group officer. Since all consumer credit scoring models ignore the identity of the
lender, minorities will face higher borrowing costs in the marketplace purely due to sta-
tistical discrimination. This insight relates to a body of theoretical work, following Arrow
(1973), that rationalizes statistical discrimination as an equilibrium with self-confirming
beliefs, but that is silent about the origin of these beliefs. If statistical discrimination is a
consequence of in-group preferential treatment, a policy that increases the likelihood of a
group match between lenders and borrowers would unambiguously improve the efficiency
of credit allocation in consumer credit markets.5
4See, for example, Goldin and Rouse 2000, Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004 and Charles and Guryan
2008 for evidence in labor markets, and List 2004 for evidence in sports card trading markets. There
is also evidence of discrimination in different types of credit markets, such as mortgages (see Ross et
al. 2008 for one recent example, and Ladd 1998 for a survey of the evidence), small business lending
(Blanchflower et al. 2003), trade credit (Fafchamps 2000; Fisman 2003), and online person-to-person
lending (Pope and Sydnor 2010).
5See Kim and Loury 2009 for a discussion of the origin of statistical discrimination, and Coate and
Loury 1993, Norman 2003, and Fryer and Loury 2005, for discussions of optimal policy prescriptions in
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Prior work that examines the role of group identity using dyadic data finds mixed
results. Ayres and Siegelman (1995) finds evidence of race and gender discrimination in
an audit study of price bargaining in the U.S. new car market, but finds no evidence of
in-group preferential treatment. In contrast, Price and Wolfers (2010) and Parsons et
al. (2011) find evidence consistent with race-based discrimination among NBA referees
and MLB umpires, and Schoar, Iyer and Kumar (2008) find that sellers bargain for lower
prices when the seller belongs to the same community in an audit study in India. The
key contribution of our study is to provide evidence of the effect of cultural proximity in
a context where the negative effects of animus-based discrimination may be countered by
the positive effects of better information exchange and enforcement.
Our paper also relates to the literature on the economic consequences of social ties
between transacting parties.6 Our results indicate that cultural proximity increases the
likelihood of two individuals who have likely never met interacting in the market and
forming a tie. This suggests that social ties are endogenously formed as a consequence
of common cultural endowments. The effects of cultural endowments and social ties are
typically confounded in existing work that associates endogenous past social interactions
with future market transactions.7 The distinction is important because cultural endow-
ments, such as religion and caste, are assigned at birth and transmitted across generations
of individuals of the same group, while social ties and connections are dynamic and often
subject to individual choice (Becker 1996). This implies that the economic consequences
of cultural endowment differences across groups that we document in our analyses can
persist in the long run, and potentially perpetuate inequality.
Finally, our study relates to the literature on the role of soft information in economic
such multiple equilibrium settings.
6For evidence of the effect of social connections on economic interactions see, for example, Banerjee
and Munshi 2004 and Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul 2009.
7For examples of this work see Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy 2008, 2010, Hwang and Kim 2009, Engel-
berg, Gao and Parsons 2011, Jackson and Schneider 2011, and Li 2012.
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transactions. Much of this research has focused on credit relationships, and indeed many
of the outcomes that we examine—the extent and price of credit, as well as loan quality—
are also the focus of this literature (see, for example, Keys et al 2010; Petersen and Rajan
1994). We note, however, that owing to officer rotation, we are better able to identify the
effects of soft information relative to papers that have used time-invariant proxies for soft
information between lenders and borrowers.
In the next section, we provide a brief discussion of models of lending under conditions
of asymmetric information, and discuss the implications for the analysis that follows.
Then, Section 3, we turn to providing an overview of the data and a description of the
Indian bank that we study—its organization, the incentives of its officers, and so forth. In
Section 4 we present the baseline empirical specification for the analysis. Section 5 presents
our results on lending quantity and quality; Section 6 presents an additional set of results
on loan dispersion, and heterogeneity by borrower, officer, and branch characteristics,
which we use to explore which prominent models of in-group lending are consistent with
the data. In Section 7 we conclude with some policy implications and directions for future
work.
2 Theoretical Background and Motivation
In the discussion that follows, we will lay out the comparative statics provided by promi-
nent models of information asymmetries in credit markets, describing how we expect loan
quantity, repayment rates, and loan dispersion to be affected by reduced informational
frictions. These frictions may be either ex ante, relating to the lender’s ability to assess
project quality, or ex post, affecting the lender’s ability to ensure that funds are used
as agreed and that the loan is repaid. We will take whether bank officer and borrower
are of the same group—henceforth referred to as SameGroup—as a measure of cultural
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proximity, and consider the empirical predictions of a model where cultural ties reduce
information asymmetries. It is beyond the scope of our analysis to decisively pin down
the mechanism through which cultural proximity affects lending, but we can explore the
extent to which our data are consistent with these existing models.
In the canonical models of credit markets under asymmetric information, the effect of
better information on credit access is ambiguous. For example, asymmetric information
may increase or decrease the level of credit depending on whether borrowers have private
information on the level or the variance of project returns (De Meza and Webb 1987;
Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). At the extreme, a lender that faces severe information asym-
metry will pool all borrowers, which may lead to a larger amount of credit than in the
high-information SameGroup case, or to no credit at all. Given this theoretical ambiguity,
our empirical exercise can be viewed as an assessment of which type of effect dominates
in an important real-world setting.
There is greater agreement across these well-known models in their predictions on the
effect of information frictions on default. In both of the cases above, a better-informed
lender can screen out low-quality (from the bank’s perspective) projects ex ante thus re-
ducing default. Improved information similarly reduces the cost of borrowing for those
that receive credit. The emphasis in these models is on screening, but reduced infor-
mational frictions can also improve credit access and outcomes by allowing for improved
ex post enforcement as documented, for example, by Fafchamps (2000) in ethnic trading
networks in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, a primary pair of predictions shared by these (and
other) models of lending in the face of information frictions is that default rates and the
cost of funds are lower for SameGroup borrowers. Since interest rates are fixed in our
setting, we focus on collateral as a measure of borrowing cost (higher risk borrowers will
post more collateral holding the interest rate constant), and examine whether collateral
to loan ratios are lower for SameGroup loans.
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Cornell and Welch’s (1996) screening model shows that lower information frictions
within a group will be reflected in larger loan size dispersion for the group. The reason for
this is that better-informed lenders receive more precise signals of creditworthiness, which
implies that the variance of the distribution of priors of SameGroup borrower quality
across borrowers will be greater. Thus, a prediction that may help us to identify the
presence of better in-group screening is that loans to SameGroup borrowers have higher
dispersion.8 Note that this does not rule out enforcement-based explanations, which make
no strong predictions about the ex ante loan size distribution, but will allow us to assess
whether our data are consistent with models where better screening plays a role.
We conclude our background discussion with an overview of how models of reduced
informational frictions through shared culture contrast with models of preference-based
discrimination in the spirit of Becker (1957). Favoritism in this class of models is man-
ifested in the cost that an individual incurs as a result of his in-group preferences. For
example, a business owner sacrifices profits or, in our context, a loan officer reduces
his performance (and hence career progression) in order to indulge his discriminatory
preferences. Such models of SameGroup favoritism predict a higher level of SameGroup
interactions and on more favorable terms—predictions potentially shared by models of
information asymmetries—but predict lower-quality transactions.9 In our context, pref-
erence based discrimination implies a higher default rate for SameGroup borrowers — the
cost to the loan officer of favoritism. This also highlights some limitations of our analysis
— our data are less suited to picking up on the effects of SameGroup favoritism that do
not entail a cost to the loan officer.
8Rajan et al. (forthcoming) use a similar test to show that an increase in ‘distance’ brought about by
securitization leads to lower information production on loans.
9Parsons et al. (2011), for example, find evidence of racial bias in baseball umpires’ strike calls, but
only in stadiums where their calls are not monitored and thus there is no possible sanction to their
biased behavior. This represents evidence that agents trade off the benefits of acting according to biased
preferences against the potential costs of doing so.
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3 Data
The main variables in the analysis are obtained from the individual loan portfolio and
personnel records of a large state-owned bank in India, which operates over 2000 ge-
ographically dispersed branches (see Appendix Figure A.1). The sample starts in the
second quarter of 1999 and ends in the first quarter of 2005. This section describes in
detail the structure and construction of the dataset and relevant background information
on the organization of the bank itself.
3.1 Loans, Borrowers, and Branch Heads
The individual loan portfolio data include loan-level information for every borrower with
a loan outstanding during the sample period (2.92 million individuals). Loan contract
characteristics and repayment status are reported on a quarterly basis (1.23 million bor-
rowers per quarter on average). Since we are interested in comparing the lending decisions
of in-group and out-group officers around officer rotations, we focus our analysis on the
flow of new debt from a branch b, to a group g, in quarter q. The bank issued just over
1.8 million new loans during the sample period. The mean (median) new loan amount is
59,681 (22,506) rupees. We focus on flows, given that the incoming officer played no part
in the decision to issue a loan prior to their arrival at a branch.10
We use the bank’s quarterly personnel records to identify the head officer of each
branch in each quarter (4,270 distinct officers in total). Loan officers are classified into
six grades, with increasing seniority and ability to approve larger loan amounts. The
highest-ranking officer in each branch is the branch head. For smaller branches, the
head officer may himself have a relatively low grade. This implies that any larger loan
10The analysis in a previous version of the paper focused on the stock of debt: amount of debt out-
standing for the borrowers in a group at any point in time. The results are qualitatively similar, but
noisier. We thank the editor and an anonymous referee for suggesting this change.
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request that comes through the branch will have to be approved by a higher grade officer
elsewhere in the region. Still, in these cases the decision of whether to submit the loan
for approval at a higher level of the bank hierarchy is at the head officer’s discretion, and
based on information collected at the branch level. Officers have control over loan and
collateral amounts, but they have no discretion over interest rates, which are determined
by headquarters based on loan type. For example, all home improvement loans pay the
same rate, as do all educational loans above Rs.400,000.
Branch heads—the focus of our analysis here—are evaluated annually using a range
of criteria.11 These include quantitative measures such as the amount and profitability of
lending, as well as qualitative considerations such as employee skill development, effective
customer communication, and other aspects of “leadership competency.” Officers are held
accountable for loan defaults after moving branches. Typically, officers are responsible for
loans they approve for three years following their departure, at which point responsibility
is transferred to an officer in the branch where the loan was made.
While there is limited incentive pay, branch heads are motivated through promotion to
higher grades or better postings. As a result, branch heads face strong incentives to issue
profitable loans and perform well along other qualitative dimensions that serve as inputs
into their evaluations. Since successful branch heads may be sent to locales with more or
better perquisites, such as higher pay (overseas), larger houses, the use of a car, or control
over a larger portfolio (large branches), in the analysis that follows we evaluate the extent
to which such endogenous allocation of officers to branches affects our estimates.
11Information on evaluation and compensation of managers within the bank come primarily from
interviews with bank staff; we do not have access to individual evaluations.
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3.2 Religion, Official Caste, and Religious Caste
The bank records contain information on the religion and official caste classifications
of each borrower and employee. Individuals are grouped into seven categories based
on the prominent religions in India: Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Parsi, Buddhist,
and others. They are also classified into four castes based on the categories explicitly
recognized by the Constitution of India: General Class (GC), Scheduled Castes (SC),
Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC). The SC category comprises
all the castes historically treated as “untouchable” by the upper castes in India. The
ST category includes indigenous, typically geographically isolated, tribal groups. The
OBC category is a collection of caste groups ranked above untouchables in the ritual
hierarchy, but socially and educationally disadvantaged. Individuals belonging to the
SC, ST, and OBC categories receive targeted government aid and benefit from positive
discrimination policies (subject to means testing) such as reservations in public sector
employment and higher education.12 Although the SC, ST, and OBC categories include a
wide variety of social groups across India, locally they are often relatively homogeneous.
The GC category is essentially a collection of all the individuals not belonging to the
aforementioned “backward” classes.
In order to obtain a group classification that is independent of the bank’s records, we
use the borrower and officer surnames to generate a classification based on religious castes.
According to religious texts such as Manusmriti, Hindu society is broadly divided into four
Varnas: the Brahmins (priests and scholars), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaishyas (merchants
and traders) and Shudras (laborers and artisans). Each Varna is a unification of several
12The categories of Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) which represented a majority of
lower-status castes and tribes were first protected in anti-discrimination laws through the ninth schedule
of the Constitution in 1950 (Article 15, 17, and 46). In 1990, the further caste-based categorization of
OBC was added for identifying additional socially and economically deprived communities. A few years
later the category of OBC was extended to include a significant segment of the non-Hindu population,
notably Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs.
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Jatis, or communities (see Buhler 1886), and a person’s surname typically reflects the Jati
they belong to. We exploit this link with surnames to classify each individual into their
Varna (see Banerjee et al. 2009 for a further discussion of the link between surnames
and castes in India). In the online Appendix we provide a description of the matching
procedure and some specific examples.
Using surnames to classify borrowers and officers by religious caste results in several
sources of additional noise and imprecision. First, many surnames can be classified into
two or more Varnas.13 We create three special categories for individuals where this ambi-
guity arises (Kshatriya-Brahmin, Kshatriya-Brahmin-Vaishya, and Kshatriyas-Vaishyas).
We note, however, that within a region there is usually only a single Varna associated with
each surname. So once we condition on region—as we do throughout our analysis—there
is a clearer link between names and communities. Second, it is unclear how to categorize
individuals into the Shudra Varna according to their community affiliations, which pre-
cludes using surnames for individuals outside of the General Classes. Finally, in less than
1 percent of cases, the surname-based classification conflicted with the bank classifica-
tions assigned to loan officers and borrowers. For example, many bank-classified Muslims
had “Hindu” surnames, and vice-versa. Still, exploring the effect of proximity along the
Varna dimension is interesting in its own right, and will allow us to ascertain whether the
results based on bank classifications are driven by systematic misclassification of officers
and borrowers in the bank records.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics - Group Composition
The religion, official caste, and Varna compositions of the borrower and officer populations
are shown in Table 1. By religion, Hindus represent the majority of borrowers (89.4%)
13For example Saxena is grouped under both Brahmins and Kshatriyas. Similarly Desai is grouped
under both Brahmins and Vaishyas.
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and officers (93.8%). The largest group of minority borrowers is Muslim (6.33%), and
the largest officer minority is Christian (2.1%). Hindus are over-represented and Muslims
under-represented in the borrower and officer populations relative to the total population
(80.5% Hindu and 13.4% Muslim according to the 2001 census). Most borrowers and offi-
cers are classified as General Class (66.7% and 74.3% respectively). The largest borrower
minority is the OBC category (16.6%), while the largest officer minority is ST (15.7%).
SCs are under-represented in the borrower sample and STs under-represented in the officer
sample, relative to the population (16.2% SC and 8.2% ST in the 2001 census).14
We are able to match surnames to Varnas for a subsample of the population. A
total of 502,723 borrowers (18.3% Brahmin, 60.5% Kshatriya, 6.6% Vaishya, 1.7% mixed
categories, and 5.72% in other categories) and 1,689 officers (23.0% Brahmin, 43.4%
Kshatriya, 11.7% Vaishya, 15.5% mixed categories, and 6.4% in other categories) have
Varna assignments. These represent approximately 17% of borrowers and 40% of officers in
our sample. All identifiable Varnas in our sample belong to the General Class according
to official caste definitions. The average size of new loans issued to surname-matched
borrowers is 4% larger than the average size of loans issued to unmatched borrowers
classified as Hindu General Caste in the bank’s records. The difference is statistically
significant, indicating that the surname-matched sample is comprised of borrowers with
access to marginally higher loan amounts relative to the general population of Hindu
General Caste borrowers.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics - Branches and Groups
In the average (median) branch-quarter, the total flow of new loans is 2.36 (1.50) million
rupees, issued to 39.6 (31) borrowers (Table 2, Panel 1). The borrower composition is
generally heterogeneous: the median branch issues new loans to borrowers of two different
14The 2001 India Census does not keep track of OBCs.
15
religions and two different official castes. The median branch is small, with two loan
officers including the head officer, and the modal branch has a single officer.
The unit of analysis is the branch-group-quarter level (indexed by b, g, and q, respec-
tively) where group refers to the cultural group of the borrower. In our main specification
we use the full set of religion and caste information to group borrowers into 9 categories:
5 minority religions, and 4 official castes conditional on the religion being Hindu. In other
specifications we consider group definitions based on Varna classifications. The panel
employing our main group classifications has 339,366 branch-group-quarter observations
(descriptive statistics shown in Table 2, Panel 2). In the average group-branch-quarter
cell the sum of new loans is 245,800 rupees. Not all groups receive new loans in all periods
from all branches: only 33.8% of the cells have positive debt flow (as a consequence the
median group-branch-quarter debt flow is zero).
In order to have a dependent variable that captures both changes in the amount of
credit to a group (group-intensive margin) and the probability of a group receiving credit
(group-extensive margin), our preferred specifications use the flow of credit to a group
in a branch divided by the total flow of new credit allocated by the branch in the same
quarter (in what follows we will use the terms new credit and new loans interchangeably
to refer to the flow of new credit issued). The group-branch-quarter average (median)
Fraction of Branch New Credit is 0.116 (0.0). Similarly, we define Fraction of New Loan
Recipients as the ratio of the number of new loan recipients in a group-branch-quarter
divided by the number of new loan recipients in the same branch-quarter (the average is
also 0.116).
We use two measures of the cross sectional dispersion of new loan sizes among the
individuals in a group, the standard deviation (SD) and the inter-quartile range (IQR).
The average branch-group-quarter SD and IQR of loans are 29.9 and 22.6 thousand rupees
respectively. The bank records the sum of all the collateral pledged by a borrower at
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any given time (not the amount of collateral that secures a particular loan). Thus, we
report and analyze collateralization based on the stock of credit outstanding to the set of
borrowers receiving new loans in each quarter. The median branch-group-quarter ratio
of total collateral to total outstanding debt for these borrowers is 2.37. The average
maturity is 2.8 years and the average interest rate is 11%. New loan recipients must be
current in repayments in order to receive a loan. We measure default as the probability
of a new loan recipient being over 60 days late (in any loan) one year after the loan is
issued. The branch-group-quarter average fraction of borrowers that default according to
this definition is 8.6%.
We merge the branch-level personnel information to this panel to obtain our main
explanatory variable, SameGroupbgq, a dummy variable that is equal to one for the
branch-group-quarter loan cells where the branch head officer belongs to group g, and
zero otherwise. For example, if the head officer of branch b in quarter q is Muslim, then
SameGroupbgq = 1 for loans to group g if g = Muslim, and zero for all other groups in
that branch-quarter. Since this dummy is equal to 1 for one and only one group at any
given branch-quarter, its sample average is 1
9
= 0.11 by construction.
3.5 Officer Rotation
The bank follows an explicit policy of geographical officer rotation, with the stated ob-
jective of reducing opportunities for corruption, nepotism, and other perverse incentives
in the allocation of loans. As a result, branch turnover is high: we observe an average of
127 head officer reallocations per quarter, and the median branch has one officer change
during our sample period. The mean (median) spell of a head officer in a branch is 8.3 (8)
quarters, with standard deviation of 4.1. Head officers are always assigned to branches
that are located away from their home town, and the average officer reallocation assigns
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the officer to a new branch that is 250 kilometers from the previous assignment. This im-
plies that although officers generally stay within the same region, it is unlikely that they
have had any prior interaction with any of the potential borrowers in their new location.
In Table 3 we report the empirical distribution of branch transition rates by group,
along with the theoretical distribution of transition rates that would result from random
matching across branches nationally. We observe a total of 3,316 officer transitions. To
examine the extent to which the empirical distribution differs from that dictated by ran-
dom assignment we perform a permutation test as follows: we fill each of 3,316 positions
in an array in proportion to the number of officer-quarter observations of that group ob-
served in our data. So, for example, given that 70.2% of officer-quarter observations are
General Caste Hindus, 2,327 (0.702*3,316) of the initial positions are assigned to General
Caste Hindu. We then randomly permute the ordering of the initial assignment, and use
the observed transitions to generate a transition matrix. We repeat this process 1,000
times, and test whether the empirical transition rates fall within the 90, 95, or 99% con-
fidence interval of the simulated distribution. We highlight with asterisks the transition
rates that are statistically different from those that would result from assigning officers at
random. A comparison of the empirical and simulated distributions indicates that, over-
all, there are significantly more within-group transitions than would be expected from
random rotation.
The relatively high proportion of within-group transitions is expected since some states
in India have reservation policies that require a minimum representation of SC, ST, and
OBC officials in any government position. The key assumption of our identification ap-
proach, which we discuss in detail in the next subsection, is that the rotation policy
induces variation in the matching between officer and borrower group identity that is
plausibly uncorrelated with the demand for credit. We will return to the issues raised
by possible non-random assignment, and the validity of our empirical approach, in Sec-
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tion 5 where we present “event study” patterns around officer transitions to show that
assignment to an in-group officer is not preceded by abnormal increases or decreases in
credit to a group. In addition, our main empirical specification uses saturated regressions
that incorporate branch-quarter (which subsume officer fixed-effects), group-quarter, and
district-group-quarter dummies that address various selection-based alternative explana-
tions.
4 Empirical Specification
Our baseline empirical specification identifies the effect of cultural proximity from the
time series variation in loan outcomes for a particular group, in a particular location,
when the group identity of the officer changes due to the rotation policy. The specifica-
tion takes the following form:
ygbq = βSameGroupbgq + αgb + τbq +
∑
d
γdgq + bgq (1)
The dependent variable in most specifications is a lending outcome of a group in a
branch-quarter, relative to the overall outcome in the same branch quarter. For example,
when we analyze the impact on the flow of new credit, the dependent variable is the ratio
of new credit to all borrowers that belong to group g in branch b and quarter q to the new
credit issued to all groups in branch b in quarter g. SameGroup is an indicator variable
denoting whether the branch head in branch b belongs to group g in quarter q.
For most of our results, we present specifications that include group-branch (αgb),
branch-quarter (τbq), and District-group-quarter (γ
d
gq) dummies, where d indexes the dis-
trict in which the branch is located. This full set of fixed effects helps to rule out a range
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of identification concerns. The group-branch dummies capture time-invariant attributes
of each group within each branch, and ensure that the estimation of β does indeed come
from the time series variation induced by officer rotation. The branch-quarter fixed effects
account for all changes in the demand for credit in a particular location, as well as changes
in directed credit policies aimed at certain localities. Since there is only one branch head
at a time in each branch, the branch-quarter fixed effects also account for changes in
an officer’s behavior over time, for example, due to experience or learning. Finally, the
district-group-quarter dummies capture shocks to and trends in the demand for credit of
specific groups in narrowly defined geographical areas (conditional on having a branch,
the median district has three bank branches in our sample). This helps us to rule out the
possibility that the estimated β is the result of, for example, reverse causality driven by
the endogenous allocation of officers into areas where their own group is thriving. In the
estimation we allow the error term bgq to be clustered at the branch level. This accounts
for serial correlation in lending and for the mechanical correlation of SameGroup across
groups in the same branch.15
The coefficient on SameGroup is a difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of
cultural proximity between a lender and a borrower on loan outcomes. Consider, for
example, the regression with the fraction of new credit as the dependent variable and,
for simplicity, suppose there are only three groups: Hindus, Muslims, and Christians.
Suppose that a branch has a Hindu officer during the first half of the sample, and a Muslim
officer during the second half. The coefficient on SameGroup will be the weighted average
of (1) the difference between the fraction of new credit obtained by Hindu borrowers in
the branch when the officer is a Hindu (in-group) officer relative to when the officer is
a Muslim, and (2) the difference between the fraction of new credit obtained by Muslim
15By construction, every time SameGroup changes from zero to one for group g in branch b, it will
change from one to zero for some other group in the same branch b.
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borrowers with a Muslim officer relative to a Hindu one. While our main results show the
average effect across all groups, we will also allow the effect of SameGroup to vary across
religions and castes.
5 Results: Loan Quantity and Quality
We begin with a graphical description of (unconditional) lending patterns around officer
transitions. First we classify borrowers into two categories based on whether they have
the same group identity as the outgoing officer: in-group borrowers are those belonging to
the same group as the officer, and all others are categorized as out-group borrowers. For
example, in a branch where the outgoing officer is Christian, the Christian borrowers are
in-group before the officer change, and borrowers from all other religions are classified as
out-group. Each of these borrower groups may or may not experience a change in their
in-group/out-group status after the officer change. For example, suppose the Christian
officer is replaced by a Muslim one. Then, Christian borrowers transition from in-group
to out-group, Muslim borrowers transition from out-group to in-group, and other religions
remain as out-group throughout. Alternatively, if the replacement officer is also Christian,
then Christian borrowers remain as in-group and all minority borrowers remain as out-
group.
We use these borrower classifications to construct “event study” plots around officer
changes. The horizontal axis of the plots in Figure 1 measures time in quarters since the
officer change in a branch. Event time t = 0 represents the first quarter when a new officer
appears as the branch head in the personnel files. Given that our analysis is based on
quarterly data, the new officer may arrive up to 11 weeks before the observed entry time.16
The vertical axis measures the average fraction of new debt in a branch allocated to a
16This measurement error in the time of arrival of the new officer will tend to bias towards zero our
estimates of the in-group effect in specification (1).
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group of borrowers and the 95% confidence interval (with group-branch means removed,
and normalized to zero at time t = −4 to facilitate visual inspection of the time series).
Since officers remain at an assignment for a minimum of two years, we use an eight quarter
window around their arrival. This ensures that we do not double-count observations in
the figure. There are, however, fewer observations at points further from t = 0 owing to
truncation of officer spells at the beginning and end of our sample period.
To construct the plots we partition the borrower groups into four subsamples de-
pending on the type of in-group/out-group status change they experience due to officer
rotation. Panel a is constructed for the subsample of borrowers for which an in-group
officer replacing an out-group one leads to increased in cultural proximity for these bor-
rowers. Panel c contains borrowers who have experienced the opposite transition, from
in-group to out-group officer. For these borrowers, the officer change thus led to a decrease
in cultural proximity. Panel b (d) is for borrowers who have experienced no change in
their out-group (in-group) status, and thus no change in their cultural proximity to the
officer.
We highlight three patterns in these plots, as they are strongly suggestive of a causal
relationship of cultural proximity on the flow of credit. First, officer changes that involve
an increase (decrease) in cultural proximity between the officer and set of borrowers
are immediately followed by a statistically significant 3 to 4% increase (decrease) in the
fraction of new credit allocated to those borrowers. Second, officer changes that do not
affect officer-borrower cultural proximity are not followed by changes in the flow of credit
(implying that our estimates are not confounded by a “new officer” effect).17 Third, there
17These plots do not mean that a “new officer” effect does not exist, merely that it is second order
relative to the effect of cultural proximity and statistically indistinguishable from zero in the data. The
patterns also indicate that an increase in the fraction of new lending to in-group borrowers does not
mechanically decrease the fraction of lending to all other groups, as would occur, for example, if branches
were subject to a binding capital constraint. The decline in lending occurs exclusively for those borrowers
that lose in-group status with the officer change.
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is no pre-officer-change trend in the fraction of credit allocated to a group in any of the
four plots. This observation represents strong evidence that the group identity of the new
officer is unrelated to either the group identity of the outgoing officer or the evolution of
credit market conditions leading up to the officer change. Taken together, the patterns
observed in Figure 1 validate the identification assumptions behind the difference-in-
difference estimator of the in-group effect in specification (1).
5.1 In-Group Effect on Credit Quantity
In Table 4, we present the effect of having an in-group branch head on new credit, esti-
mated using the specification (1) above. We emphasize that these analyses use a combina-
tion of branch-quarter, district-group-quarter, and group-branch fixed effects.18 Outcomes
are measured at the level of group g in branch b in quarter q, starting in column 1 with
total new debt obtained by group g as a fraction of total new debt in branch b, and in
column 2 with the number of new credit recipients in group g as a fraction of the total
number of new credit recipients in branch b. In both cases, we find a positive and signif-
icant effect of SameGroup on credit access. The estimated coefficients indicate that the
fraction of credit obtained by group g borrowers increases by nearly 6.5 percentage points,
and the fraction of new borrowers from group g relative to total new borrowers increases
by 5.65 percentage points following the transition to an in-group branch manager.
In the remaining columns of Table 4, we explore the group-extensive and group-
intensive margins to examine how cultural proximity affects the probability that a group
will receive credit, and conditional on receiving credit, how it affects the amount given.
We report on the coefficients on SameGroup using our baseline specification with four
dependent variables: a dummy equal to one if the group receives any new credit (column
18There are 37,709 branch-quarter dummies, 19,155 group-branch dummies, and 43,723 district-group-
quarter dummies.
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3), the average (log) new credit (column 4), the (log) number of new credit recipients (col-
umn 5), and (log) average new loan size (column 6). Due to the log transformation the
last three variables are defined only for group-branch-quarters where there is a positive
debt flow. The point estimates indicate that all these measures of lending increase when
an in-group officer is present in a branch, and the effect is significant at the 1 percent
level.19
We present a pair of additional tables in the appendix to probe the robustness of our
results to different specifications and definitions of cultural proximity. First, in Appendix
Table A.1 we present analyses similar to those of Table 4, columns 1 and 2, with various
combinations of fixed effects that are less stringent than those in our saturated specifi-
cation in (1). Neither the magnitudes nor the significance of the estimated parameters
change markedly. We take the stability of these estimates as strong evidence that the
relationship between our variable of interest, SameGroup, and credit market outcomes, is
unlikely to result from problems such as omitted variable bias.
Appendix Table A.2 repeats the estimation (again using saturated specifications) us-
ing the group definitions based on the traditional religious caste system (Varna), obtained
through surname matching. The dependent variable is now scaled by the total lending
in the branch to all matched borrowers (and not all branch loans), so the estimate mag-
nitudes of this specification are not directly comparable to those above. The estimated
effect of cultural proximity on lending is again positive and significant for the fraction
of credit, the number of borrowers, and the probability of receiving credit (the effect
on loan size and other intensive margin measures is not statistically significant). The
Varna grouping is constructed independently of the bank’s classification of officers and
borrowers, indicating that the observed in-group effects are not driven by systematic mis-
19The estimates on total debt, number of borrowers and loan size (columns 4, 5, and 6) are still
significant after accounting for the fact that these are estimated conditional on the group receiving credit
using Lee (2008) bounds (not reported).
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classification of borrowers by the bank. Also, since it is implausible (and illegal) for the
bank to use Varnas to allocate credit or assign jobs, the Varna-based results provide an
independent validation of the identification assumption that the group identity of the
officer in a branch is uncorrelated with directed lending policies targeted to borrowers of
the same group.
5.2 In-Group Effect on Loan Quality
As highlighted in Section 2, prominent models of credit markets under asymmetric in-
formation predict that, if cultural proximity reduces information frictions, then the ex-
pansion of in-group credit access that we document in the preceding section should be
accompanied by improved repayment. By contrast, if favoritism is the dominant source of
within-group preferences, standard models predict that the increase in lending will be the
result of credit expansion to (lower-quality) marginal borrowers, leading to a deterioration
in average lending quality.
We first examine the impact of cultural proximity on future loan performance by
estimating specification (1) using the fraction of borrowers who are more than 60 days
past due in a year.20 As before, the unit of analysis is the branch-group-quarter level,
and our outcomes of interest are calculated over all the borrowers in branch b, group g,
that received new loans in quarter q. The outcome of interest is the fraction of borrowers
that received new loans in quarter q who are past 60 days overdue in quarter q + 4
(FractionInDefaultbgq+4). Since the bank keeps record of late repayments as a borrower
outcome (and not a loan outcome), our default measure reflects payments overdue on any
loan, not just the loan received in quarter q.
20The results are almost identical when we use 30 and 90 days past due. We also employed specifications
that used the log of one plus the number of days late as the outcome variable. These regressions generated
results that are qualitatively very similar to those we report in the text, but do not have any clear economic
interpretation.
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The estimated coefficient on SameGroup for loan performance is presented in Table 5,
column 1. The point estimate of the effect of cultural proximity on the fraction of loans
more than 60 days overdue 12 months forward is negative and significant at the 5% level.
The coefficient of -0.006 (-0.6 percentage points) implies an 7% reduction in the default
probability for in-group loans relative to the mean of 8.6%.
A taste-based model of higher in-group lending that would also lead to higher repay-
ment rates is one where cultural proximity induces loan officers to extend additional loans
to insolvent in-group borrowers to make payments on past loans. This “evergreening”
explanation also implies that the impact on loan performance should be relatively short-
lived, and in particular that it should disappear when an in-group officer is replaced by
an out-group one. In column 2, we test whether the positive effect of cultural proximity
on performance disappears or is attenuated when the in-group officer is replaced with an
out-group one by using a pair of interactions to distinguish between the following two
cases (a) SameGroup=1 12 months after the loan is issued by an in-group officer, ver-
sus (b) there is no longer an in-group officer 12 months after an in-group loan is made.
Specifically, we consider the separate effects of SameGroupbgq on default four quarters
ahead (FractionInDefaultbgq+4) when the officer still belongs to the same group four
quarters ahead (SameGroupbgq × SameGroupbgq+4) and when the officer does not be-
long to the same group four quarters ahead (SameGroupbgq × (1 − SameGroupbgq+4)).
Intuitively, the latter of these terms captures the extent to which default declines even
when the SameGroup officer is replaced by an out-group one. We find that both terms
are negative and significant, implying that the improvement in performance observed at
quarter q that is caused by having an in-group officer originate a loan in quarter q − 4 is
present even if the loan officer at time q is no longer an in-group one. This result suggests
that ever-greening is unlikely to account for the higher quality of SameGroup loans. It
also indicates that the increase in performance is unlikely driven by direct supervision,
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monitoring or other actions that require the loan officer’s presence.
The view that in-group lending reduces information frictions further predicts that the
lower default rates we observe should reduce the average cost of borrowing. Since loan
interest rates are fixed in our setting, we focus instead on collateral as a proxy for the
borrowing cost, and examine whether collateral to loan ratios are lower for in-group loans
(holding the interest rate constant, higher risk borrowers will be required to post more
collateral to borrow the same amount). To do so, we employ our baseline specification (1),
using as a measure of collateral intensity the logarithm of the group’s average ratio of total
collateral to outstanding loan amount (note that, in contrast to ratio-based outcomes, our
collateral measure is defined only for groups with positive credit outstanding).21 In Table
5, column 3, we show that the estimated in-group effect on collateral to loan ratios is −3.98
percentage points, significant at the 1% level. This indicates that in-group borrowers
post on average 4 fewer rupees of collateral per every 100 rupees of credit outstanding,
relative to out-group ones. This is consistent with cultural proximity reducing the cost
of borrowing, and rules out preference based explanations in which the borrower becomes
safer (e.g. because they do not want to default on someone from their own group) but
the officer is unaware of it.
Finally, in Table 5, columns 4 and 5, we repeat our baseline specification using two
additional loan characteristics — loan maturity in years and interest rate — as the depen-
dent variable. In both cases, the coefficient on SameGroup is statistically insignificant.
The coefficients also indicate that if there is an effect on these contract dimensions, it is of
low economic significance. For term length, the coefficient implies that average maturity
increases by 0.06 years (21 days), and for interest rates the coefficient implies that the
annualized interest rate increases by 0.016 percentage points, both negligible magnitudes
21Recall that the bank does not record the collateral pledged to secure a specific loan, but the total
amount of collateral pledged by the borrower. For that reason we cannot measure the collateral associated
with new loans only.
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relative to the average loan. This is an indication that, as we note in Section 3, loan
officers exercise very little discretion over interest rates or maturity. It further indicates
that officers do not reclassify loans—e.g., investment versus consumption—to achieve the
same end.
5.3 Heterogeneity by Caste and Religion
In our main results, we presented the average effect of cultural proximity over all castes
and religions. It is natural to ask how our findings may differ by group. In Table 6
we allow for the impact of shared culture to vary by religion and caste by interacting
SameGroup with dummies for each of the five major minority religions and, conditional
on the religion being Hindu, the four government sanctioned castes. The effects are on
average larger, sometimes by an order of magnitude, for minority religions than for castes
within Hindus. Since Hindu castes represent larger groups, one interpretation of these
results is that there is a strong negative correlation between group size and the effect of
cultural proximity. This across-group heterogeneity potentially indicates that the benefits
of cultural proximity in access to credit may be limited by group size.
The effect of cultural proximity also exhibits substantial heterogeneity across minority
religions: the effects range from 0.66 (significant at the 1% level) for SameGroup ×
Muslim to 0.03 (not significant) for SameGroup×Parsi, and the difference of the effect
across groups is always statistically significant. A plausible explanation for the very small
effect for Parsis is that they are, as summarized by a 2012 article in the popular press,
widely known for “diligence and trustworthiness.” The same article goes on to observe
that Parsis tend not to be “clannish,” which might suggest that any role of favoritism in
increasing loan quantities is also muted amongst Parsis.22
22“Straight, Honest Parsimony,” Arti Sharma, Outlook India September 2012.
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Across castes the heterogeneity is much smaller: the effects range from 0.033 for
SameGroup×General to 0.012 for SameGroup×SC, and the differences across groups are
not always significant. This is a natural result of government-mandated castes serving as
less potent sources of identity and differentiation relative to religion. (Given that the effect
of caste is much smaller, combined with the fact that Hindus are a significant majority in
India, our estimated effect of SameGroup in Table 4 may be seen as an overestimate of
the average impact of cultural proximity for the overall population. In unreported results,
we find that the coefficient on SameGroup falls by about half in estimating the effect of
cultural proximity on lending quantity (significant at the 1 percent level) when we weight
observations by one plus the number of borrowers.)
Overall, these results highlight the nuanced relationship between the effect of cultural
proximity and group size. While there is a rough concordance between group size and
strength of identity on the impact of in-group lending, the relationship is more complex:
for example, the impact of SameGroup on borrowing is greatest for Muslims, the largest
religious minority. Among Hindu borrowers, the biggest effect is also among the largest
group (General). In the future, we may shed further light on these patterns by delving
further into general attitudes toward particular groups, and into the extent of assimilation
of individual religions or castes.
6 Further results: Heterogeneity and Loan Disper-
sion
The preceding section documented robust patterns along the two main dimensions of
credit market outcomes: quantity and quality of lending. Among prominent models of
credit markets under information asymmetries, our findings are more easily reconciled
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with those where cultural proximity reduces information frictions rather than those that
emphasize favoritism. In our final section, we present findings on how credit provision
differs across borrower, officer, and branch characteristics, as well as results on loan size
dispersion, to explore a broader set of potential explanations for our results.
6.1 Heterogeneity by Branch Density and Size
We have assumed, up to this point, that in-group favoritism is driven by lender rather
than borrower preferences. If borrowers prefer same-group loan officers, they may choose
to reward them with higher-quality lending opportunities. While our data cannot fully
rule out this possibility — as we note in our introduction, they are best-suited to detecting
favoritism which comes at a cost to the lender — we may probe the plausibility of this
argument by examining how the SameGroup effect varies by branch attributes.
In particular, we examine whether the impact of SameGroup is affected by the presence
of other borrowing options as proxied by branch density in a district, given by number
of branches from all financial institutions per 1,000 inhabitants. The number of branches
per district is obtained from the website of the Reserve Bank of India and the number
of inhabitants per district from the India Census, both from 2001. The average number
of branches per 1,000 inhabitants is 0.81 across the 357 districts with a branch from the
bank in our data. There is substantial heterogeneity in this measure across districts, with
0.18, 0.54, and 1.88 as the 1st, 50th and 99th percentiles respectively. The districts with
the highest branch densities typically correspond to urban areas and the lowest densities
to rural ones.
In Panel 1 of Table 7, we estimate specification (1) using only the 89 branches where the
bank is the only one in its district (since there is only one branch per District in this sample
we have to amend the specification to include State-Group-Quarter dummies instead
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of District-Group-Quarter dummies). These are rural areas where there are essentially
no other formal financing opportunities available. We observe that, if anything, the
SameGroup effect is stronger in isolated areas, with the coefficient in Column 1 taking
a value of 0.082 (significant at the 1% level) compared to 0.065 for the full sample. We
further observe that these isolated branches tend to be small, with a median of just a
single officer (i.e., the branch head) across all branch-quarter observations compared to
a median of two for the full sample, so the absence of other branches more plausibly
indicates an uncompetitive market rather than an entry deterrence strategy by the bank.
In Panel 2, we present results for the full sample that allow the effect of SameGroup
to vary across branch density quartiles; the effect of cultural proximity is strongest in
branches with few nearby banking options. (We also find a strong positive correlation
between branch density and branch size, again suggesting that the lack of nearby branches
indicates lack of competition rather than entry deterrence.)
These findings are difficult to reconcile with demand-side explanations for the in-group
effect where, for example, there are readily observable low-risk borrowers that generate
relatively high profits for any bank attracting them as customers. If these sought-after
borrowers choose to take their business to bank branches based on cultural affinity then
the arrival of a same-group officer would trigger an increase in lending and also an improve-
ment in loan performance with same-group. However, this type of ‘business-stealing’ effect
should be attenuated in regions where the bank holds significant monopoly power, counter
to our finding of a strong SameGroup effect in districts with low bank density. This does
not fully rule out the possibility that our results are driven by borrower preferences—for
example, cultural ties may be so strong that they lure low-risk borrowers across district
boundaries—but given that districts with a single bank branch are geographically iso-
lated, our full set of findings is more easily reconciled with an interpretation based on
same-group officers serving to reduce information frictions. (Additionally, the fact that
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the effect of cultural proximity remains strong even in small markets with few competitors
suggests that the expansion of credit for in-group borrowers is unlikely to crowd out credit
by other banking institutions.)23
6.2 Heterogeneity by New versus Pre-existing Borrowers
We now turn to evaluating how the effect of cultural proximity varies across borrowers who
have an existing credit record with the bank versus those who do not. This comparison is
useful in understanding how cultural proximity interacts with hard sources of information
used in the credit assessment process. Since there is no centralized credit registry that
collects borrowers’ credit histories during our sample period, the only source of hard
information available to lenders is a customer’s own borrowing and repayment record at
the bank. We can therefore use heterogeneity in the effect of cultural proximity across
first-time and preexisting borrowers to evaluate whether the information advantage from
cultural proximity is a substitute or a complement for the hard information contained in
credit histories.
We partition the borrower sample into two groups: 1) borrowers that have established
a credit relationship with the bank prior to the arrival of the current officer, and 2)
borrowers that receive credit from the bank for the first time with the current officer.
We scale the dependent variable by the total new loans of the branch to each group of
borrowers and estimate the group-branch level regressions on these subsamples, which
23In Appendix Table A.3 we show that the fraction of lower-level loan officers in a branch from a
particular group increases lending to borrowers from their group, but the effect is about a tenth of that
which we estimate for the impact of the group ties of branch heads. There are several factors that can
account for the modest in-group effect of lower-level officers. First, it is consistent with branch heads
playing a dominant role in loan decisions. This is particularly the case for higher loan amounts, which
require approval from a higher-ranked officer. As we observe in Appendix Table A.4, the in-group effect is
increasing in loan size percentile (consistent with the increased loan dispersion associated with in-group
lending that we document in subsection 6.4), which already comprise a disproportionately high fraction
of total loan amounts. A further potential explanation for the muted in-group effect of lower-level officers
is that, according to bank officials, these data are updated less frequently than branch head information,
resulting in classical measurement error.
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provide the effect of cultural proximity on the flow of credit to preexisting versus new
borrowers.
Table 9, Panel 1 shows the estimates of a branch-group level specification that includes
in every branch-group-quarter bgq those borrowers who had positive credit at any time
before the officer in charge of branch b in quarter q arrived. The estimates indicate that
the arrival of an in-group branch head increases the amount of new loans (column 1) and
the number of new loan recipients (column 2) amongst those borrowers with a pre-existing
relationship with the bank. Panel 2 of Table 9 shows a very similar impact of SameGroup
for the subsample of borrowers obtaining credit from the bank for the first time.
The similarity of the point estimates suggests that the informational advantage con-
ferred by cultural proximity is not a substitute for the hard information held by the
lending institution in the form of a history of past borrowing and repayment behavior.
In this were the case, we would expect to see a smaller effect of cultural proximity on
loan outcomes for existing borrowers. By contrast, the evidence suggests that cultural
proximity and loan history have additive effects on loan outcomes. This in turn suggests
that the documented effect of cultural proximity is unlikely to be mitigated by the intro-
duction of a credit bureau or other changes in the information environment that rely on
past borrower behavior to evaluate creditworthiness.
6.3 Heterogeneity by Officer Tenure at Branch
We conclude our analysis of heterogeneity by examining the dynamics of the effect of
cultural proximity over an officer’s tenure in the branch. These dynamics may inform our
understanding of whether the effect of cultural proximity requires time to develop (this
would be the case, for example, if the officer collects information through a network of
acquaintances that takes time to build), or if its importance diminishes over time as a
33
result of the loan officer’s experience and interaction with out-group borrowers.
Figure 2 plots the coefficients on the interaction between SameGroup and a set of
indicator variables for the officer’s quarter of arrival at the branch (t = 0), his second
quarter at the branch (t = 1), and so on until t = 7. The graphs for the effect of cultural
proximity on both the fraction of new credit (Panel 1) and the fraction of new credit
amongst first-time borrowers (Panel 2) in a group show an immediate impact of the new
in-group officer: In the first quarter of the officer’s recorded arrival (t = 0), both measures
increase by about 10 percentage points. This immediate increase in the flow of credit is
followed by slow decay, and although the point estimates are positive throughout, the
estimates are no longer statistically different from zero after t = 1. We also observe that,
while the point estimates decline with officer tenure, the confidence intervals increase such
that we also cannot reject an increase in the SameGroup effect over the officer’s tenure.
These dynamics suggest that cultural proximity confers an immediate advantage to the
officer, and that the officer uses it to extend new credit to a ‘backlog’ of in-group borrowers
(both borrowers that already received credit from the bank and new ones). The integral
below this plot represents the change in the stock of lending to in-group borrowers, and
suggests that cultural proximity generates a permanent increase in access to credit while
the in-group officer is in place. The effect of cultural proximity on the flow of credit never
becomes negative, as would occur if the in-group advantage disappeared as the loan officer
became more acquainted with out-group borrowers. Overall, the observed patterns suggest
that loan officers are “endowed” with an information advantage in evaluating in-group
borrowers, and that the advantage of lending to in-group borrowers is not attenuated with
the officer’s interaction with other groups.
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6.4 In-Group Effect on Loan Size Dispersion
Cornell and Welch (1996) provide the novel prediction that improved ex ante screening
should increase the dispersion in lending: officers receive higher precision signals of cred-
itworthiness from in-group borrowers, increasing the variance of the distribution of priors
across in-group borrowers. In our setting, a higher variance of priors will imply a higher
variance of loan sizes to in-group borrowers.
To assess the effect of cultural proximity on loan dispersion, we estimate the baseline
specification (1) using two measures of within-group loan dispersion: the standard devi-
ation and the interquartile range of the new loans issued in branch b, group g, quarter q.
The estimated in-group effects are positive and significant for both measures. The point
estimates indicate that cultural proximity increases the standard deviation (inter-quartile
range) of loans outstanding by 11.8% (11.1%). In Appendix Table A.4 we show that an
in-group officer has a positive and significant effect on all percentiles of the loan size distri-
bution in a group (10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 90%), though the coefficient on SameGroup
increases monotonically with percentile. The estimated effect on the 90-th percentile of
the distribution of new loans (0.033) in Appendix Table A.4 is smaller than the average
effect in Table 4 (0.08). Thus, cultural proximity shifts up the entire distribution of loan
sizes, but the effect on loan amount is large for a small fraction of in-group borrowers.
These results indicate that cultural proximity has heterogeneous effects on access to
credit across borrowers. Combined with the observed effect on loan performance, the
dispersion results suggest that cultural proximity improves the sorting and allocation of
credit across in-group borrowers. These findings are consistent with better in-group ex
ante screening as in Cornell and Welch (1996) or with heterogeneous monitoring effective-
ness across in-group borrowers.
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we have measured the extent of differential treatment in the loan market
for those with a shared cultural background. Our empirical context is well-suited to as-
sessing differential in-group treatment: since we have data on both lender and borrower
group affiliations, we may distinguish between own-group preferences versus differential
treatment of minorities. Furthermore, exogenous officer rotation allows us to distinguish
in-group preferences from changes in officer branch assignments. Finally, since we focus
on credit markets, by analyzing loan outcomes we may explore whether the data are more
easily reconciled with standard models of reduced information asymmetries versus stan-
dard models of favoritism. Overall, our findings are best explained by cultural proximity
serving to reduce information frictions in the credit markets we study.
Our study has a number of implications for theories of discrimination as well as eco-
nomic policy. First, we note that the preferential treatment we uncover can itself per-
petuate income inequality among minorities. In our context, 74.4% of the officers belong
to the General Class category. This implies that the probability of a backward caste
borrower (SC, ST, or OBC) facing unfavorable loan conditions is nearly 75%, purely for
reasons of cultural affiliation.
Moreover, our findings suggest one possible mechanism through which statistical dis-
crimination against minorities can arise. Minorities will not often be “matched” with a
loan officer of their own group and will hence have inferior loan outcomes on average. As a
result lenders may form what are ultimately self-confirmatory beliefs about the creditwor-
thiness of minorities if they rely on past average group performance to generate lending
rules (Kim and Loury, 2009).
Finally, our findings have several policy implications. In the Indian context, targeted
reservation policies that impose a larger proportion of backward caste officers in regions
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with a high concentration of backward caste borrowers may improve efficiency and reduce
inequality of loan allocation. The reason, however, is different from preference-based ratio-
nales for political reservations (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004). Our analysis suggests
that reservations may improve contracting outcomes because they reduce information
asymmetries between loan officers and borrowers.
While it is impossible to fully evaluate the overall welfare implications of our findings,
we may assess the conditions under which borrower welfare and the bank’s profitabil-
ity improve, which are useful metrics in evaluating the impact of in-group lending. As
concerns borrower welfare, increased access to credit and a lower cost of borrowing un-
ambiguously increase welfare. As we show in Appendix Table A.4, an in-group officer has
a positive and significant effect on all percentiles of the loan size distribution in a group.
Thus, under the assumption of equal utility weighting across good and bad borrowers,
cultural proximity leads also to an increase in borrower welfare.
From the lender’s perspective, a welfare analysis requires first taking a stance on
whether the bank’s objective is to maximize loan profitability. If we take the normative
view that the goal of a government bank in India should be to improve borrower wel-
fare, then the discussion in the previous paragraph already implies that, under plausible
assumptions, cultural proximity furthers this objective. If one augments the bank’s objec-
tives to include profit maximization, the welfare analysis is complicated by the difficulty
of measuring loan profitability in our context. Specifically, it requires that we make an
assumption on whether the marginal cost of capital is lower than the cost of funding the
marginal loan. Existing work evaluating lending practices of government banks in India
suggests that banks lend too little relative to their cost of capital (Banerjee, Cole, and
Duflo 2004, Banerjee and Duflo 2008). Under this assumption, the combined effect of an
increase in lending and a reduction in default probability would necessarily increase bank
profits, assuming that the loss-conditional-on-default does not substantially increase. We
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showed in Table 2 that the median loan in the sample is over-collateralized by a factor of
2—the total collateral posted by the borrower is more than double the total amount of
credit outstanding. This means that the relatively small decline in the collateral require-
ment observed with in-group officers is unlikely to affect the recovery rate on defaulted
loans. We also obtained data on recovery rates for a small number (16,924) of loans in
default; we find no difference in recovery rates for SameGroup loans (whether defined at
time of write-off or initiation). It is thus likely that the expansion in lending caused by
cultural proximity improves loan profitability.
Our findings also provide valuable input for policy discussions on the group-based
assignment of loan officers or other bureaucrats. It is important to observe that there are
many considerations involved in such decisions. As such, our findings should not be taken
as a blanket endorsement of a policy of maximizing cultural proximity through officer
rotation as it may, for example, reduce officers’ incentives to learn about the cultural
traits of out-group borrowers. That is, while the ’local’ effect of in-group matching could
be positive, it may be outweighed by longer-term consequences. Further, a policy of
maximizing cultural proximity could also impact the level of corruption within the bank,
or even affect the average quality of loan officers selected to be branch managers. A more
detailed analysis of such tradeoffs may serve as a fertile ground for future analysis.
There are a number of additional areas for research that are needed to draw out the
full policy consequences of our findings. First, it would be useful to assess whether policies
directly aimed at reducing cultural differences across groups—for example, by teaching a
common language—lead to improvements in cross-group contracting. Second, while our
findings highlight improvements in transaction-level efficiency from cultural proximity,
to make an overall assessment of the efficiency consequences for the bank as a whole, it
would be necessary to understand how the increase in overall lending that comes from
matching borrowers and lenders affects allocation within the bank more generally. As
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noted in Banerjee and Duflo (2006), bank officer incentives may lead to under-lending in
Indian state banks and as such a credit expansion of the sort we document in our paper
may represent efficiency gains more broadly. Providing rigorous evidence on this question
of bank-level efficiency would require more detailed information on the bank’s fuller set
of funding and lending opportunities; we leave this for future work.
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Figure 1: New Credit around Officer Change, Borrowers Partitioned by Transition Type
(a) From Out-group to In-Group Officer
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The horizontal axis measures time, in quarters, since the group experienced an officer change (0 represents the first quarter
of the new officer). The vertical axis measures the average fraction of credit to a group, with group-branch means removed,
and normalized to zero at t = −4. Group is defined based on a classification of borrowers and officers into five minority
religions and four government sanctioned castes (conditional on the religion being Hindu). Borrowers are partitioned into
four subsamples depending on whether they experience a transition from an out-group to an in-group officer (panel a), an
out-group to an out-group officer (panel b), and so on. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval of the mean
by quarter.
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Figure 2: Effect Heterogeneity by Officer Tenure in the Branch
(a) Effect of Cultural Proximity on Total Credit
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(b) Effect of Cultural Proximity on Number of Borrowers
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The horizontal axis measures time, in quarters, since the officer arrived in the branch (0 represents the first quarter with
the new officer). The vertical axis plots the point estimates and 95% confidence interval of the estimated in-group effect by
tenure of the officer in the branch (using specification (1) augmented with interactions between SameGroup and a set of
indicator variables for the time of the officer in the branch).
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Table 1: Borrower and Head Officer Composition, by Religion and Caste
Group refers to the religion and caste (conditional on Hindu religion) that the borrower belongs to. There
are nine groups: five minority religions and, conditional on Hindu religion, four government sanctioned
castes.
Borrowers (%) Head Officers (%)
Panel 1: by Religion
Hindu 89.36 93.79
Muslim 6.33 1.84
Christian 1.81 2.06
Sikh 1.95 1.76
Parsi 0.13 0.05
Buddhist 0.19 0.25
Other 0.23 0.25
Panel 2: by Official Caste
General 66.66 74.31
SC 10.67 15.68
ST 6.02 5.12
OBC 16.64 4.89
Panel 3: by Varna
Brahmin 18.28 23.01
Kshatriya 60.52 43.43
Vaishya 6.59 11.67
Kshatriya/Brahmin 1.72 10.77
Kshatriya/Brahmin/Vaishya 6.76 3.48
Kshatriya/Vaishya 0.41 1.29
Other 5.72 6.35
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel 1: branch-quarter panel statistics. Panel 2: branch-quarter-group panel statistics (group: bor-
rower’s religion and caste conditional on Hindu religion). There are nine groups: five minority religions
and, conditional on Hindu religion, four government sanctioned castes.
Mean Std. Dev. p1 p50 p99
Panel 1. Branch-Quarter Statistics, N = 46,753
Total New Credit (millions of rupees) 2.36 3.74 0.00 1.50 14.22
# of Borrowers 39.6 48.9 0.0 31.0 200.0
# of Different Borrower Religions 1.85 0.91 0.00 2.00 4.00
# of Different Borrower Castes 2.35 1.08 0.00 2.00 4.00
# of Different Borrower Groups (5 minority religions, 4 castes) 3.18 1.50 0.00 3.00 6.00
# of Loan Officers (Including Head Officer) 3.53 4.20 0.00 2.00 16.00
# of Clerks 6.40 7.12 0.00 4.00 31.00
Panel 2. Group-Branch-Quarter Statistics, N = 339,366
Sum New Credit (1,000s of rupees) 245.8 1227.9 0.0 0.0 4183.0
Fraction of Branch New Credit 0.116 0.259 0.000 0.000 1.000
# of New Credit Recipients 4.11 15.13 0.00 0.00 55.00
Fraction of Branch # of New Credit Recipients 0.116 0.249 0.000 0.000 1.000
Std. Dev. New Credit (1,000s of rupees) 29.9 124.1 0.0 0.0 337.6
IQR New Credit (1,000s of rupees) 22.6 96.3 0.0 0.0 312.7
Dummy = 1 if New Credit > 0 0.338 0.473 0.000 0.000 1.000
Total Collateral/Outstanding Debt 10.50 633.61 0.33 2.37 14.92
Maturity (years) 2.83 2.95 0.00 2.43 15.00
Interest Rate (%) 10.98 2.22 3.62 11.46 15.50
Fraction of Borrowers with Over 60 Days Late after 1 Year 0.086 0.233 0.000 0.000 1.000
Fraction of New Debt with Over 60 Days Late after 1 Year 0.036 0.159 0.000 0.000 1.000
SameGroup 0.110 0.312 0.000 0.000 1.000
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Table 6: Heterogeneity by Religion and Caste
In this table we report the estimated effect of cultural proximity on the new debt and number of recipients
(as a fraction of branch debt and number of recipients) by religion, and, conditional on the religion being
Hindu, by Caste. Standard errors are clustered at the branch level. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable Total New Debt/ # of Borrowers/
Total New Debt in Branch # of Borrowers in Branch
(1) (2)
SameGroup × Muslim 0.6370*** 0.6354***
(0.038) (0.039)
SameGroup × Christian 0.3901*** 0.3905***
(0.027) (0.027)
SameGroup × Sikh 0.4039*** 0.4137***
(0.043) (0.044)
SameGroup × Parsi 0.0303 0.0077
(0.028) (0.015)
SameGroup × Buddhist 0.3542*** 0.3397***
(0.114) (0.105)
SameGroup × Hindu - General Caste 0.0310*** 0.0185***
(0.007) (0.007)
SameGroup × Hindu - SC 0.0115*** 0.0057
(0.004) (0.004)
SameGroup × Hindu - ST 0.0112 0.0041
(0.010) (0.009)
SameGroup × Hindu - OBC 0.0323*** 0.0267**
(0.012) (0.011)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Branch-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Group-District-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 331,053 331,053
R-squared 0.854 0.872
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Table 7: Heterogeneity by Branch Density in District and Branch Size
In this table, we report the heterogeneity of the estimated effect of cultural proximity on lending outcomes using specification
(1) across districts of different branch density and branch size. The unit of analysis is a branch-group-quarter, where group
is defined by combining religion- and caste-based measures of cultural proximity. The variable SameGroup is an indicator
denoting that borrowers and the branch manager are of the same group. Standard errors are clustered at the branch level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable Total New Debt/ # of Borrowers/
Total New Debt in Branch # of Borrowers in Branch
(1) (2)
Panel 1: Subsample of branches where there is no other branch in the District (88 branches)
SameGroup 0.0818*** 0.1224***
(0.024) (0.030)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Branch-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Group-State-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 13,358 13,358
R-squared 0.895 0.920
Panel 2: Effect Heterogeneity by Branch Density in the District
SameGroup 0.0758*** 0.0687***
(0.013) (0.013)
SameGroup × -0.0476** -0.0416**
Branches per 1000 inhabitant in District = quartile 2 (0.020) (0.019)
SameGroup × -0.0176 -0.0213
Branches per 1000 inhabitant in District = quartile 3 (0.017) (0.016)
SameGroup × 0.0003 -0.0013
Branches per 1000 inhabitant in District = quartile 4 (0.016) (0.016)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Branch-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Group-District-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 329,325 329,325
R-squared 0.853 0.870
Panel 3: Effect Heterogeneity by Number of Officers in the Branch
SameGroup 0.0462*** 0.0363***
(0.010) (0.010)
SameGroup × 0.0208 0.0213
# of Officers in branch = 2 (0.014) (0.015)
SameGroup × 0.0306** 0.0340**
# of Officers in branch > 2 (0.013) (0.013)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Branch-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Group-District-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 322,654 322,654
R-squared 0.853 0.870
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Table 8: Existing and First-Time Borrowers
In this table we report the estimated effect of cultural proximity on lending patterns (specification (1))
separately for existing borrowers (Panel 1) and first-time borrowers (Panel 2). Existing borrowers are
those that have obtained credit at any time in our sample prior to the arrival of the current officer in
charge of the branch. First time borrowers receive their first credit from the Bank under the current
officer. The unit of analysis is a branch-group-quarter, where group is defined by combining religion-
and caste-based measures of cultural proximity. The variable SameGroup is an indicator denoting that
borrowers and the branch manager are of the same group. Standard errors are clustered at the branch
level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable Total New Debt/ # of Borrowers/
Total New Debt in Branch # of Borrowers in Branch
(1) (2)
Panel 1. Subsample of Borrowers that have obtained Credit from Bank prior to Officer’s Arrival
SameGroup 0.0512*** 0.0446***
(0.007) (0.006)
Branch-Group and Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 266,273 266,539
R-squared 0.737 0.770
Panel 2. Subsample of Borrowers Obtaining Credit for the First Time
SameGroup 0.0510*** 0.0473***
(0.006) (0.006)
Branch-Group and Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 360,910 360,910
R-squared 0.809 0.809
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Table 9: Effect of Cultural Proximity on Loan Dispersion
In this table we report the estimated effect of cultural proximity on (log) measures of the size dispersion of
new loans to a group (interquartile range and standard deviation). The unit of analysis is a branch-group-
quarter, where group is defined by combining religion- and caste-based measures of cultural proximity.
The variable SameGroup is an indicator denoting that borrowers and the branch manager are of the same
group. Standard errors are clustered at the branch level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%.
Dependent Variable ln(Std. Dev.) ln(IQR Debt)
Debt)
(1) (2)
SameGroup 0.1182*** 0.1110***
(0.027) (0.027)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Branch-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Group-District-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 72,329 71,842
R-squared 0.726 0.703
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APPENDIX
For Online Publication
A Matching Surnames to Varnas
Since the association between individual names and their borrowing and employment
records is proprietary and cannot be disclosed outside the bank, the process of assigning
individuals to the Brahmin, Kshatriya, and Vaishya groups followed four steps:
1. The bank provided us with a list of all surnames—both borrowers and officers—
present in bank records.
2. We searched Google and the Anthropological Survey of India (Singh, et al., 1998,
2003, 2004) to establish a community association for each name.
3. We searched Google, Wikipedia, matrimonial websites, and other references (Dahiya
1980, Dudhane 1996, UNP, Marathas 2010, Maheshwari Samaj 2006, Bindu 2008)
to establish the link between communities and Varnas.
4. After the matching was complete, the bank linked community and Varna information
to bank records by surname, before removing the borrower and manager identifiers
from the data.
The following are examples of the name matching and search process using three
common surnames in India:
• Example 1: Surname Birla; a Google search for the surname found it listed in one
of the matrimonial sites of the Maheshwari Samaj community (Maheshwari Samaj
2006); in the Maheshwari Samaj we find information that Birlas belong to the
Vaishya Varna.
• Example 2: Surname Rathod; it was found in the Anthropological survey of India
to be commonly used by the Rajput community (K. S. Singh et al., 2004); following
1
up with K. S. Singh et al. (2004) we find that the Rajputs are Kshatriyas according
to the Varna system.
• Example 3: Surname Deshpande; a Google search found the surname listed under
the Deshastha community;24 a search on Kamat.com showed that this community
belongs to the Brahmin Varna.
24http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of Deshastha Brahmin surnames
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Figure A.1: Geographical Distribution of Branches, Weighted by Total Lending
The centers of the circles indicate the location of the branches. The area represents the total amount of lending in the
branch in 2002.
3
Table A.1: Robustness of the Saturated Regression
In this table we report the estimated effect of cultural proximity on loan outcomes using specification
(1) with alternative sets of dummies as controls. Group is defined by combining religion and caste based
measures of cultural proximity (five minority religions and four government designated castes conditional
on Hindu religion). The variable SameGroup is an indicator denoting that borrowers and the branch
manager are of the same group. Standard errors are clustered at the branch level. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable Total New Debt/ # of Borrowers/
Total New Debt in Branch \# of Borrowers in Branch
(1) (2)
Panel 1. Baseline Branch-Group Fixed Effects
SameGroup 0.0814*** 0.0765***
(0.006) (0.006)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 364,056 364,056
R-squared 0.823 0.841
Panel 2. Branch Quarter Dummies
SameGroup 0.0719*** 0.0569***
(0.005) (0.005)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Branch-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 364,056 364,056
R-squared 0.152 0.169
Panel 3. Branch-Quarter and Group-Quarter Dummies
SameGroup 0.0721*** 0.0575***
(0.005) (0.005)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Branch-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Group-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 364,056 364,056
R-squared 0.159 0.191
Panel 4. State-Group-Quarter Dummies
SameGroup 0.0884*** 0.0741***
(0.006) (0.006)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State-Group-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 364,056 364,056
R-squared 0.077 0.085
Panel 5. District-Group-Quarter Dummies
SameGroup 0.0889*** 0.0748***
(0.006) (0.006)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes
District-Group-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 364,056 364,056
R-squared 0.242 0.251
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Table A.3: Effect of Cultural Proximity on the Flow of Credit - Other Officers
In this table we report the estimated effect of cultural proximity on the new debt to a group as a fraction of
branch debt (columns 1 and 2), and on the number of new loan recipients from a group as a fraction of the
number of new loan recipients in a branch (columns 3 and 4). The estimates are obtained using specification
(1), but using as a the right-hand side variable the fraction of loan officers in the branch, excluding the branch
head, that belongs to the same group as the borrower (group defined as before). This variable is only defined
for branches with more than one loan officer. Standard errors are clustered at the branch level. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable Total New Debt/ # of Borrowers/
Total New Debt in Branch # of Borrowers in Branch
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fraction of Same Group Officers 0.0087*** 0.0076*** 0.0090*** 0.0080***
(Excluding Head Officer) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Samegroup 0.0957*** 0.0873***
(Head Officer) (0.008) (0.008)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group-District-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 213,896 213,896 213,896 213,896
R-squared 0.859 0.860 0.876 0.877
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Table A.4: Effect of Cultural Proximity on the Distribution of New Loan Sizes
In this table we report the estimated effect of cultural proximity on the ratio of the p-th percentile of the flow
of new debt to a group in a branch quarter divided by total flow of branch debt. Group is defined by combining
religion- and caste-based measures of cultural proximity (five minority religions and four government designated
castes conditional on Hindu religion). The variable SameGroup is an indicator denoting that borrowers and
the branch manager are of the same group. Standard errors are clustered at the branch level. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Percentile of New Loan Amount/ Total New Debt in Branch
Dependent Variable 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SameGroup 0.0175*** 0.0180*** 0.0212*** 0.0266*** 0.0331***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Branch-Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Branch-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group-District-Quarter Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 229,865 229,865 229,865 229,865 229,865
R-squared 0.580 0.586 0.625 0.646 0.664
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